For many residents of central Asian countries, Russia remains the only realistic option to earn a living abroad, given a lack of opportunities back home. A shared language, familiar bureaucracy and established migration networks made this a natural transition following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
But is Russia still the safe haven for central Asian migrant workers it once was? Increasingly, the answer seems to be no. From tightened checks to rising xenophobia, migrants from the former Soviet countries say life in Russia has become harder than ever.
The turning point came on March 22, 2024, when an attack on Crocus City Hall, a large concert venue near Moscow, killed at least 145 people and injured more than 550. The assault was claimed by ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a violent extremist group based in Afghanistan and linked to the extremist “Islamic State” group. The trial involving 19 suspects began on August 4, 2025, in Moscow and is being held behind closed doors. Four individuals, identified as Tajik citizens, were allegedely the gunmen at the event, the other 15 people are charged as accomplices.
The attack sparked outrage, feeding anti-migrant sentiment in Russia , with central Asian workers bearing the brunt of public anger.
New restrictions and increased pressure
Following the March 2024 attack, Russian authorities began conducting frequent checks on foreign workers from April, scrutinizing their legal status and compliance with migration laws. Minor violations could result in hefty fines or immediate deportation. Many migrants report being stopped on the street for document checks, sometimes for no apparent reason. Even leaving the country briefly could lead to being added to a deportation list without explanation.
Since then, in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other parts of Russia, have introduced bans on migrant workers working in food service, retail, passenger transport and as couriers — the primary sources of employment for immigrants. Over the past year, different types of jobs have been added to the list and employers who violate the bans can be fined large amounts.
Deportation rules have been relaxed so that it is easier to send migrants out of the country. Starting in April 2024, Russia conducted large-scale raids targeting “illegal migrants,” with the peak in the summer. Over six months, Russian law enforcement detained and expelled around 86,000 foreign citizens, double the number during the same period in 2023, according to Russian human rights organization Memorial. Roughly 17,000 of them were Tajik citizens, compared to 11,000 deported in all of 2023.
Being a migrant in Russia today
Some migrants have lost work entirely or have been forced into informal employment. Speaking to DW on the condition of anonymity, one Tajik worker explained,
“I used to work in warehouses, drive taxis, and deliver for marketplaces in Russia. I arrived in 2016 after finishing school and found it like a second home, just with more opportunities. The situation has changed abruptly. Now I’m limited to construction. Every day there are new restrictions. It feels like we are no longer wanted here.”
Nuriya, 23, is finding life in Russia increasingly harsh. “I worked long hours in various low-paid jobs, including at Ozon [a major online retailer], where I went two months without pay,” Nuriya, who didn’t want to use their full name for privacy reasons, said. “Most of my earnings went to rent and food, leaving almost nothing for my family.”
Even basic services, like visiting a doctor, were stressful. Through contacts, she moved to Qatar, where she feels more respected and receives her wages on time.
Russia feeds, then starves
With 45% of its GDP coming from Russian remittances in 2024 — the largest proportion anywhere in the world according to the World Bank — Tajikistan is uniquely vulnerable to this kind of pressure. Any tightening of migration rules in Russia threatens not just individual workers but the backbone of Tajikistan’s entire economy.
Reduced migration and lower remittance flows are expected to slow economic growth, with the World Bank projecting GDP growth to drop from 8.4% in 2024 to 6.5% in 2025.
“The large-scale return of labor migrants will inevitably increase unemployment in Tajikistan and strain an already overheated job market,” says Maqsud Aripov, a Tajik economist and public policy analyst currently teaching at the Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University in China. “With few employment opportunities available — particularly in rural areas, the influx of returnees will oversupply the labor market, push more people into informal work, and raise the risk of social unrest. This is a big signal for Tajikistan to immediately rethink its migration policy.”
Aripov Maksud argues that Tajikistan should respond swiftly and comprehensively, focusing on job creation, boosting domestic production, and rethinking its migration flows, as the large-scale return of citizens requires national-level economic and labor planning rather than solely relying on Russia’s actions.
Political factors behind the crackdown
Parviz Mullodzhanov, a political scientist from Tajikistan, highlights the domestic political dimension behind Russia’s tightening of migration policy. He argues that this shift is largely driven by internal political changes and the growing influence of certain populist groups.
“The Russian authorities increasingly rely on so-called ‘Z-patriots’ and nationalists, for whom anti-migrant rhetoric is central. Since these groups are among the most vocal supporters of the war in Ukraine, their political weight has grown, and they are now actively pushing for a complete overhaul of the labor migration system, one that would impose much stricter control over migrants,” Mullodzhanov says.
However, the expert notes, moving to such a model would likely require the introduction of a visa regime with central Asian countries, something Moscow cannot afford for geopolitical reasons.
“While both sides would suffer from such restrictions, in the long run Russia stands to lose more. Cutting labor migration would increase social tensions and risks of instability in central Asia. On the other hand, it could ultimately reduce Moscow’s leverage in the region, leaving Russia at risk of losing influence over central Asian states.” Mullodzhanov concluded.
Edited by: C. Schaer
