China is hosting the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on Sunday and Monday, in what is already hailed as the bloc’s largest meeting since the SCO was founded in 2001.
More than 20 leaders including Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will attend the gathering.
The SCO now comprises 10 member states: China, India, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus. Another 16 countries are affiliated as observers or “dialogue partners.”
The bloc claims to represent 40% of the world’s population and about 30% of its economic output.
It is sometimes touted as a counter to the Western-dominated NATO military alliance.
Beijing aims to host a “summit of friendship, unity and fruitful results,” according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
Rapprochement with Russia and China
Iran became member of the SCO in 2023. Shortly afterward, it also joinedBRICS, a grouping of major emerging market economies.
By joining the two organizations, Iran is pursuing cordial ties with Russia and China in a bid to counter the US-dominated global order, said Markus Schneider, head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s (FES) regional project for peace and security in the Middle East.
At the same time, Tehran has been seeking to improve relations with its Middle Eastern rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The images of the meeting between the Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers in Beijing in March 2023 caused quite a stir.
Schneider noted that the Iranian leadership’s goal was to “prevent the formation of a pro-US, anti-Iranian axis in the region, consisting of Israel and moderate Arab states, for instance.”
“Tehran would prefer to push so-called ‘foreign’ superpowers such as the US or Israel — whom Iran refers to as the ‘big’ and ‘little Satan’ — out of the region,” he added.
No alternative to ‘looking east’
“The eastward orientation of Iran’s foreign policy has followed the broader move within the global order towards a greater degree of multipolarity,” said Hamid Talebian, an Iran expert at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg.
The Islamic Republic has particularly banked on this perceived global shift, given its isolation and strained relations with the West, Talebian pointed out.
The expert added that the shift had accelerated with the US pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and with European powers unable “to provide alternative economic pathways and relief for Iran.”
“Such dynamics practically left the pro-Western factions in a weaker position for the years to come.”
Schneider also pointed to the Israeli and US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program in June as another catalyst.
Prior to the attacks, there was still hope for a reconciliation with the West, he noted. “But many politicians in Tehran have now given up on that. There is no alternative to ‘looking east.'”
Improving ties with Gulf neighbors
The US and Israeli strikes on Iran have also pushed Tehran and the Gulf Arab states closer together.
“Washington’s unreserved support for Israel’s strikes, coupled with ambiguous talk of regime change in Tehran, is seen in the Gulf as reckless adventurism,” according to an analysis by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
“If there is one strategic lesson Gulf leaders are drawing from the crisis, it is the wisdom of their diplomatic outreach to Iran,” the report noted, pointing out that by acting independently — often in defiance of Washington — they had succeeded in establishing communication channels that offered a degree of insulation from the worst outcomes.
“Tehran’s avoidance of targeting Gulf interests or closing the Strait of Hormuz is widely attributed to this diplomacy,” the study underscored, adding: “This approach has increased Iran’s reliance on regional ties to weather US pressure, giving the Gulf states new leverage.”
Not everyone wants closer ties with Russia
Nevertheless, those in Tehran who are in favor of expanding ties with China and Russia also face pressure. Namely, many in Iran think that “these countries did not sufficiently back Iran during the 12-day war,” said Talebian.
He noted that some factions of the Iranian government “have not ruled out Iran’s engagement with the US.”
“Forces within the reformist movement and the current government are increasingly raising their criticism against Russia and advocate the Islamic Republic to not view Russia as a security provider anymore.”
Schneider said Iran was also interested in increasing its military cooperation with China. “Iran is currently looking to procure Chinese equipment to rebuild its badly damaged air defense system. It is actively preparing for the next war with Israel.”
Europe’s limited influence
Given Iran’s proximity to Russia and China, Europe currently has little influence, said Schneider.
During the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program that Germany, France, and the UK conducted with Tehran in July, they had an opportunity to influence Iran by wielding the so-called “snapback mechanism.”
The mechanism allows sanctions to be reinstated if Iran fails to comply with the conditions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which sought to end Tehran’s nuclear program.
But this will have little meaningful impact, said Schneider, noting that “there is hardly any significant economic pressure left, unless secondary sanctions are imposed.”
“Iran is weaker than ever, but Europe has hardly any leverage left,” the expert underscored.
Talebian echoed this view.
The European sides’ inclusion in JCPOA was largely due to the strong trans-Atlantic alliance at the time, and correspondingly, the influence Europe could exert on US foreign policy, he said.
He added that European influence on Washington was declining, meaning that “from the Iranian perspective, Western Europe has become less of an important player in international arena.” He pointed to the UK, Germany and France becoming weaker potential mediators “given the categorical support they have given to Israel during the war against Iran.”
This development was also in line with a global trend, Talebian said.
“The fact that today the Islamic Republic is less isolated in the Global South, particularly in the Middle East, is evidence of increasing strategic autonomy of the Global South where Western states are less able to dictate or lure countries into their own desirable foreign policy direction.”
This article was originally written in German.
Edited by: Darko Janjevic
