Thousands of people have protested in Iran in recent days against the dramatic devaluation of the currency, amid an economic crisis that has engulfed the country.
What began as a strike by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants on Sunday has become an outcry of political anger, with some even chanting “Death to the dictator!” The spontaneous protests have already spread from Tehran to other cities, such as Isfahan and Mashhad.
Is the currency crash an inflationary crisis?
One US dollar is currently worth 1.45 million Iranian rials. A year ago, the exchange rate was 820,000 rials, meaning the monthly wages of an average Iranian in full-time work are now only worth slightly more than $100 (€85).
Basic food supplies can easily consume an entire monthly income. In a heavily import-dependent country like Iran, an inflationary shock like this has had immediate, destabilizing social consequences.
Gissou Nia, a human rights lawyer and Iran expert from the Atlantic Council think tank, sees the economic crash as the catalyst for the protests, but not as its core issue. “As with the protests since December 2017, there’s often an economic catalyst,” she told DW. “But if we listen to the slogans, and the extent of the protests, it’s about profound dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime and the desire for that regime to disappear.”
It appears many Iranians no longer see the country’s economic collapse as a crisis that can be rectified, but as a systemic failure of the regime of aged revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Nia underlined the radical nature of the slogans, and their continuity. “We’re hearing things like ‘Zan, Zendegi, Azadi’ — Woman, Life, Freedom, a reference to the protests of 2022. We’re also hearing ‘Death to the dictator.’ The regime has got to go,” she said.
Previous protests made demands on the leadership for reform, but these have now mostly disappeared. The system itself is the target, and the movement is uniting different generations and their politics.
What role does the bazaar have to play?
The fact that these protests began in the bazaar is a historic shift. For decades, the bazaar has been the economic lifeline of the system, and the anchor of its political stability. The market is seen as a political early warning system and a potential multiplier of the protests. A strike by merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar played a crucial role in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which overthrew the monarchy.
Strikes in the bazaar have hit not just the food supply, but also the conservative backbone of the Islamic Republic. Nia described it as the “lifeblood of Iran’s central markets. The shop owners and others gathered to protest because the current economic situation is no longer tenable.”
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has little political leeway for making concessions to the demonstrators. In a moment of unusual openness, he recently admitted, “If the problems aren’t solved, we cannot govern.” Some argue that this is tantamount to a declaration of political bankruptcy.
The government’s draft budget for 2026 envisages tax rises of 62%, with inflation at 50%, which many on the street see as straightforward robbery. Public reactions suggest Iranians no longer differentiate between “reformers” and “hard-liners” in their political leadership, but instead see the entire political class as devoid of credibility.
How badly is the crisis affecting people?
The economic crisis has broadened into a crisis of Iranian society and infrastructure. Savings have been devalued, and food and medicines are hard to come by and barely affordable. Water and electricity supply cuts have become increasingly common. And it’s not just those on the margins who are affected, but broad swaths of the urban middle classes.
“The reality is that people can’t afford to buy food. There are many things they can’t pay for,” said Nia. The water supply in many cities is now regularly cut off, which could make political mobilization easier. When a person has nothing more to lose, they are more likely to be prepared to risk standing up to state violence.
For decades, the Islamic Republic has invested billions in its “axis of resistance,” which was intended to secure the loyalty of militias in Lebanon, Yemen and Gaza. The protests in Iran now explicitly oppose this policy of regional intervention, shattering an ideological taboo. “What we’re hearing is rejection of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” said Nia.
The nationalization of the protests shows that loyalty is no longer seen as religious or transnational, but rather in terms of the Iranian state and society. Every dollar sent to Hezbollah or Hamas is now regarded by some as theft from the Iranian people.
Can the regime stop the protests?
Even as the political leadership in Tehran sends signals aimed at placating the people, security forces have started violently suppressing the protests. Compared to previous waves of protest, the regime is trying to quash this movement at an earlier stage with violence and intimidation. This suggests that it is very nervous.
“We’re seeing videos online that show the security forces using tear gas,” said Nia. “We’re also seeing peaceful demonstrators being shot at.”
It’s a tricky balancing act for the Iranian regime. The earlier the state resorts to violence, the more clearly it signals its weakness. But its usual routine of repression is no longer an effective deterrent: For many demonstrators, it is simply confirmation that the regime has no political solutions to offer.
In the past, the Iranian regime’s knee-jerk reaction to waves of protest has been to explain them away as the result of interference by foreign intelligence services. These accusations have primarily been directed at the United States, and at Israel.
After Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad, publicly called for people to support the latest protests, Iranian media and security services have again disseminated the narrative of “guided destabilization.” But neither the speed nor the social breadth of the mobilization could realistically be controlled from outside.
For many Iranians, the reference to “foreign conspiracies” does not confirm the strength of their leaders, but their refusal to acknowledge reality.
This article was originally written in German.
