Observers say that infighting among violent Islamist groups in Nigeria could potentially contribute to the downfall of the jihadist movement there.
In September, JAS (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad) — a central faction of the Boko Haram terror group in Nigeria — launched an attack on the village of Darul Jamal in Borno state, killing dozens of locals who had only recently been resettled from a displacement camp as part of the government’s policy to repopulate rural areas. This event alone unfurled a renewed wave of infighting with its associated factions, chiefly with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
ISWAP claimed the attack occurred within areas under its control and subsequently carried out reprisals on Boko Haram fighters under the leadership of local leader Ali Ngule, who reportedly had led the Darul Jamal assault.
This then opened a bout of deadly counterattacks in return, resulting in casualties — and a weakening — on both sides.
While from the outside it seems evident that all jihadist movements have a common enemy — the so-called West — and therefore should have more in common than whatever may set them apart, the reality is quite different.
What differences divide these groups, and are there hidden opportunities for governments fighting such violent insurgents to be gained from their disagreements among each other?
Brothers-in-arms or strange bedfellows?
Since 2009, Boko Haram has been waging a bloody insurgency in northeastern Nigeria and neighboring countries. Since then the group has been responsible for at least 40,000 deaths, while displacing more than two million people from their homes.
At the peak of its notoriety in 2015, Boko Haram controlled huge areas of territory in Nigeria, in particular in Borno State, and extended its campaign of terror and fear into the border region around Lake Chad.
Eventually, government forces managed to push the group back under great duress, which has resulted in what can only be described as an uneasy standoff for the past decade.
Seeking brothers-in-arms, Book Haram’s then-leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) terror group, adapting the name of ISWAP for Boko Haram.
The Islamist group didn’t really need the support of IS for financial reasons; the area has always been economically rich, which is why the jihadists embedded and entrenched themselves so deeply there that they can generate significant resources.
It was rather for a sense of prestige at a time when the Islamic State group was the leading name in Islamist terror globally. But this is also when the cracks between the different jihadist factions first started to show: Some members of the original Book Haram group argued that this union with IS pushed it away from its core ideology — especially on the issue of the treatment of civilians in the fight of their misled cause.
Those opposing the move broke away from Shekau while nevertheless retaining the name ISWAP, securing their ongoing recognition from IS.
The Shekau-led group scrambled to reorganize and restructure, eventually becoming JAS.
To believe or not to believe
A main point of contention between both Islamist groups is the definition of who qualifies as an “unbeliever” under extremist interpretations of Islam.
ISWAP uses the basis of differentiating Muslims from non-Muslims, which has allowed the group to win the hearts of a number of local Muslim communities, especially those around the islands of Lake Chad.
By offering these people protection as well as its own version of law and order, ISWAP — though an illegal group — has managed to gain control throughout this part of Nigeria.
JAS meanwhile defines all civilians who do not join its interpretation of “jihad” as unbelievers, meaning as people who can be punished, plundered, pillaged and abused.
This difference in opinion over the concept of “nonbelievers” continually pits the two groups against each other in the region, with both sides continuously recording heavy casualties.
In 2021, the clashes reached its crescendo when ISWAP launched a daring offensive on Boko Haram’s positions in the Sambisa Forest, defeating Shekau, who killed himself in the fight.
Two Islamist groups, one enemy: the state
Vincent Foucher, a research fellow with the National Centre for Scientific Research in France, said that ever since, there’s been a “succession of combat and moments of loss and violence” on both sides.
“There must have been repeated attempts to reconcile or at least accommodate the two groups, but these have failed so far,” he opined.
He added that the clashes between the two groups that began last month, however, had been particularly deadly for both of “the two factions, because they know the terrain, and the factions lose more to combat between themselves than to attacks by the military of the Lake Chad Basin countries.”
Despite their clashes, both groups remain a major threat throughout the region. ISWAP has turned its attention chiefly on targeting military formations, overrunning at least 15 military posts this year alone and killing dozens of service personnel in Nigeria and also in neighboring Chad.
JAS, on the other hand, continues to attack local communities and perceived collaborators, making a name for itself with kidnappings for ransom. The group also does its fair share of attacking government forces.
Malik Samuel, a senior researcher at Pan-African Think-Tank Good Governance Africa, told DW that both groups have “demonstrated, at least in 2025, the ability to still pose a serious threat to the state irrespective of their fighting.”
He added that JAS has managed to continue despite losses and setbacks it experienced at the hands of ISWAP.
“We’ve seen the group also being able to not only challenge ISWAP, but also take on the military,” Samuel said.
Opportunities for the government to bleed terror groups dry
However, analysts also believe the constant internal clashes between the groups could provide an opportunity for the government to launch a full-scale targeted offensive — instead of waiting for the groups to “fight themselves to the death,” says Malik.
He highlights that ISWAP is run in a decentralized fashion — not only for administrative reasons but also to position itself in a way that reinforcements and backups can readily be made available whenever the group finds itself under intense military assault.
“What the military can do is to ensure that those reinforcements do not happen,” said Malik, suggesting that the Nigerian military should cut off access routes of ISWAP fighters situated outside the Lake Chad area.
This, he adds, should be supported by an information campaign aimed at the fighters who would be cut off from the area, which could also open doors for defections among jihadists because “a lot of fighters find it difficult to understand why these two groups will be fighting each other if their goal is to create an Islamic state.”
“A lot of them [know they] did not sign up for that,” Malik told DW.
Vincent adds that regaining control over local communities that have no choice but to abide by the jihadist groups’ rules is another key factor in ultimately winning the fight.
The terror groups “live off these areas and tax, plunder, trade and recruit. So… take back control of those enclaves and rural areas around those enclaves!”
Edited by: Sertan Sanderson
