Known colloquially as the “Chicken’s Neck,” the Siliguri Corridor is a narrow 22-kilometer strip linking mainland India to its seven northeastern states. Sandwiched between Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China, it remains one of India’s most sensitive geopolitical chokepoints.
According to media reports this week, India’s military has reinforced its eastern frontier by establishing three fully operational garrisons at strategic points around the Siliguri Corridor near the India-Bangladesh border.
DW Bengali’s Syamantak Ghosh, who frequently reports from the border regions, noted that while Indian officials remain silent on new military developments, evidence of extensive troop mobilization and reinforced deployments is clear.
The increased Indian military presence near Bangladesh comes as ties between the South Asian neighbors have deteriorated after the ouster of Bangladeshi leader Sheikh Hasina in August 2024.
During her 15-year rule, Hasina ensured relatively stable ties between Bangladesh and India. The interim government in Dhaka, established after Hasina fled to India, is no longer as friendly towards New Delhi.
India’s show of force in the northeast
Harsh V. Pant, head of the Strategic Studies Programme at the New Delhi think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF), said that the Siliguri Corridor is a “strategic vulnerability that India must safeguard.”
This comes “amid rising anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh and indications that the Yunus government is not favorably inclined toward New Delhi,” he told DW, referring to Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus, who is heading the interim administration in Bangladesh.
Along with the reports of new garrisons, India’s air force also staged one of its largest-ever air shows in the northeastern state of Assam on November 9. This came ahead of seven days of large-scale air force exercises across northeast India that run until November 20.
This all coincides with a visit by Pakistan’s navy chief to Dhaka, and a Pakistani warship anchored off Bangladesh for the first time since the war of independence in 1971.
Pant said that India has consistently signaled through military exercises “that it is cognizant of the challenges it faces in the region.” But he believes the air show was not “particularly targeted at anything.”
Retired Indian Lieutenant General Utpal Bhattacharya shared a similar perspective.
“Sometimes these are routine exercises, sometimes strategic signaling,” he told DW. “Intentions can change overnight. Today’s friend can become tomorrow’s adversary if trust erodes.”
India-Bangladesh ties at a low point
Although Pant said India’s military moves in the region look defensive and should not be seen as seeking conflict, he warned tensions could rise further due to “provocative” statements from Bangladesh’s interim government.
Pant was referring to comments made by Yunus in March, in which he described India’s northeastern states as “landlocked” and called Bangladesh “the only gateway to the ocean for the region.”
Dhaka has maintained that Yunus’ remark on India’s northeast was intended to underline the potential for regional connectivity. However, due to the area’s geopolitical sensitivity, the comment did not sit well with New Delhi.
Both governments have stayed quiet on recent military developments and declined DW’s requests for comment.
With national elections in Bangladesh due in next February, India appears to be “waiting out” the interim government, signaling it will engage “only with an elected administration.”
“Once elections happen and there is a government with a mandate, then normalization can start,” said Pant.
What is the background of tensions?
After the ouster of Hasina in August 2024, relations between India and Bangladesh hit their lowest point in years.
During her 15-year tenure, Hasina helped dismantle anti-India insurgent networks, curbed militancy, and advanced connectivity projects— including allowing India access to the Bay of Bengal, while bolstering security along the 4,000-kilometer border.
However, mistrust lingered under the surface. India’s 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which allowed a streamlined citizenship process for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Christian religious minorities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, did not sit well with Bangladesh’s Muslim-majority population.
Rhetoric in India branding Bengali-speaking migrants as “Bangladeshi infiltrators” also deepened hostility.
After Hasina’s fall, this anti-India sentiment boiled to the surface, exacerbated by the former prime minister fleeing to India.
Hasina’s ongoing refuge in India has deepened the existing distrust.
Despite repeated requests from Dhaka, New Delhi has remained silent on sending her back. Bangladesh sees her access to Indian and international media as a further provocation.
On November 12, Dhaka summoned the Indian envoy to express concern over Hasina’s media appearances. She faces trial in absentia for crimes against humanity linked to last year’s deadly crackdown on anti-government protesters, with a verdict due on November 17.
Former Bangladeshi diplomat M. Humayun Kabir told DW that for 15 years, India has appeared to believe it could control Dhaka.
“That era has now ended,” Kabir said, even as “India’s inclination to dominate Bangladesh has intensified.”
Pakistan-Bangladesh ‘newfound love’
Along with the renewed tensions between India and Bangladesh, comes what Pant from ORF has called a “newfound love between Bangladesh and Pakistan.”
It was with Pakistan that Bangladesh fought a bloody war to break free from in 1971, and India was a major supporter of the cause both diplomatically and militarily. But since Bangladesh’s interim government took power, Pakistan has stepped up its engagement with Dhaka.
Islamabad has sent high-level delegations, including its foreign minister and intelligence chief, to Dhaka, signed trade agreements, and revived military cooperation with naval visits and defense talks.
Analysts say Bangladesh is trying to counter India’s influence, while New Delhi sees the rapprochement as a security threat.
“Bangladesh will always acknowledge India’s role in 1971,” security analyst and retired Bangladeshi general Fazle Elahi Akbar told DW. “But that doesn’t mean it will keep bowing to India when its own interests are being sidelined,” he added.
Former diplomat Kabir said that while Bangladesh “understands the foundations of its ties with India,” there is the need for “mutual respect, equality, and dignity,” elements Kabir argues are missing on India’s part.
One positive step is a visit by Bangladesh’s interim security adviser, Khalilur Rahman, to New Delhi on November 19 to attend the Colombo Security Conclave, a regional security conference, which is being hosted this year by his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval.
The timing of the visit, amid heightened tensions, is seen as highly significant.
Edited by: Wesley Rahn
