Terrorism will not be an finish in itself however a means to a political finish (Hutchinson, 1978; Drake, 1998: 53; Chenoweth and Moore, 2018). The act of terrorism will be outlined because the intentional menace or use of power to create a psychological response, for example, to evoke concern as a sign to the broader inhabitants or to realize wider political objectives similar to affecting a political consequence (Chenoweth and Moore, 2018). Second, ideology, probably the most elusive ideas in social science (see McLellan, 1995), will probably be understood as ‘an action-orientated set of political concepts’ for the aim of this essay (Heywood, 2017: 299; Brahami, 2019). Ideology particularly gives an account of: (i) the prevailing order; (ii) the specified future; (iii) a proof of how political change must be led to (Heywood, 2018: 4). This essay argues that terrorists want an ideology as a result of an ideology is important to outline an overarching goal and targets, to have an inside justification for assaults, and, for the terrorist organisation at massive, to draw sources and recruits. This argument is structured as follows. Firstly, I current my important argument that an ideology is important for the intention, execution, and expansionof terrorist exercise. I exemplify this level with the terrorist instances of Anders Behring Breivik, Elliot Rodger, and Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel whose assaults had diverging ideological underpinnings and totally different ranges of organisation. Secondly, I current the rationalist objection to this argument that terrorism generally is a rational selection to realize materials beneficial properties, glory, and significance, with out the necessity for ideology. Third, in response, I argue that this objection fails for 3 causes: (1) terrorism is a statistically unsuccessful means to an finish (Abrahams, 2006); (2) it’s troublesome to discern a rationalist technique from its ideological tenets; (3) on a person stage, it’s unlikely that terrorism is a rational pursuit for materials beneficial properties. Fourthly and eventually, I elevate the second counterargument that terrorists do not want an ideology as a result of psychological circumstances (diseases) will be the only real driver of radicalisation. I’ll argue that this objection fails as a result of an assault with the only real intention of hurt will not be terrorism, however illicit violence. This leads me to conclude that terrorists want an ideology.
To start with, terrorists want an ideology as a result of ideology is important for the intention, execution, and growth of violent extremist exercise (Holbrook and Horgan, 2019). Ideology, as a collective prism to view and make sense of the world, offers a lens by means of which one defines a objective or goal and deems a state, establishment, or an individual responsible or deserving of assault (Drake, 1998). For terrorists, ideology particularly (1) defines the overarching goal in addition to corresponding targets, (2) offers the inner justification for the execution of assaults, and (3) for organisations at massive, attracts sources and recruits. Terrorists, thus, want an ideology. Take for example the instance of Elliot Rodger, the then 22-year-old incel-motivated terrorist, who attacked a sorority home and killed 4 individuals (Witt, 2020: 675). The incel (self-identifying involuntary celibates) ideology is essentially composed of three beliefs: (i) the societal hierarchy is set on the idea of bodily look; (ii) girls are drawn solely to males based mostly on their bodily attractiveness with out regard for persona; (iii) girls are liable for their isolation and rejection (Hoffman et al., 2020; Gentry, 2022). Collectively, this worldview is designed to have far-reaching societal results (intention), targets violence primarily at girls (targets), permits people to justify the assaults (justification), and attracts sources and recruits (growth) (Hoffman et al., 2020: 565). Rodger’s 133-page manifesto proved that his incel-ideology was his final motivation for his lone-wolf terrorist assault (Allely and Faccini, 2017). Equally, Anders Behring Breivik’s, the Norwegian mass assassin, 1,518-page manifesto clearly demonstrates that ideology was the explanatory issue of his terrorist assaults on July 22, 2011 (Hagtvet et al., 2011; Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014; Gullestad, 2017). The Good terrorist assault, then again, exemplifies how terrorist organisations at massive want ideology to draw recruits. Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, the terrorist who murdered 86 individuals in Good on Bastille Day, looked for on-line Islamist extremist content material just a few days earlier than the occasion, which gave him the inner particular person justification for the terrorist assault (Horgan, 2008; Holbrook and Horgan, 2019). The function of ideology in terrorism is, nonetheless, not inflexible however fluid; for some terrorists, the ideological parts could be extraordinarily salient, as Rodger’s and Breivik’s manifestos present, for others, it could be extra refined, as Lahouaiej-Bouhlel quick on-line search exemplifies. Nonetheless, as Kellen Konrad (1982: 10) states: ‘[a] terrorist with no trigger will not be a terrorist’.
One may strongly push again on this argument by arguing that terrorists don’t want an ideology as a result of collective rational or socio-organisation impetuses drive terrorism as an alternative. This entails that terrorism generally is a strategic, rationalist selection and power of the final resort to efficiently obtain materials beneficial properties, glory, and significance with out any ideological issues taken under consideration. The important thing assumptions of this strategy are: (1) preferences are secure over time; (2) terrorist teams are unitary actors (Neumann and Smith, 2007; Chenoweth and Moore, 2018). To exemplify this objection, take for example Clarke’s (2004) view on the rationale behind the 9/11 assaults: he argues that Al Qaeda’s assaults had been strategically meant to induce the U.S. right into a warfare within the Center East and unify the Islamic world. This rationalization solely adopts a rationalist perspective and implies that terrorists do not want ideology on an organisational stage. It, thus, understands terrorism as an efficient coercive technique (Abrahms, 2006: 42). Different rationalist theorists concluded that rationality additionally efficiently applies within the case of Chechnya or suicide bombing (Sandler et al., 1983; Dugan et al., 2005; Hepworth, 2013). This organisational rationalization invokes the query: do terrorists on an particular person stage want an ideology to execute the assaults? This view on terrorism additionally understands particular person selections to be the results of cost-benefit analyses that do not have to embody any ideological parts. As an example, these advantages could embody the perceived chance of glory and the fulfilment of the hunt for significance (see Borowitz 2005 and McBridge 2011). McCauley and Moskalenko (2010: 89) argue that some may be a part of a terrorist group looking for connection and comradeship. Moreover, Brahimi (2019) places ahead the view that terrorism could possibly be a means out of problematic former life. As an example, in line with Brahimi (2019: 298), the explanations for Choudhury, a key recruiter for the Al Qaeda community, to assist the terrorist organisation had been the misuse of his sister-in-law’s cash to go to prostitutes in Singapore and his faked most cancers prognosis. Briefly, one may push again on the view that terrorists want an ideology by arguing that for each people and organisations, materials or social advantages may outweigh the prices of terrorism with none want for ideological issues.
But, this counterargument is problematic in, at the least, 3 ways. First, terrorism is an unsuccessful means to an finish on condition that the strategic goals of terrorist teams are solely achieved seven p.c of the time (Abrahams, 2006: 43). As an alternative of specializing in single case research (cf. Abrahams. 2004) or a range of some notorious assaults (see Lake, 2002), the research by Abrahams (2006) analyses the political plight of 28 terrorist organisations since 2001, which led to the conclusion of the seven p.c success price. The discovering of a poor price signifies that terrorists’ coercive technique is quite ineffective and, due to this fact, an irrational technique, as one can now not argue that it’s, on common, a rational technique. Second, it’s troublesome to discern whether or not Al Qaeda’s technique was a provocation technique or an inadvertent consequence of an overarching ideological pursuit. Particularly when the general technique included non-rational selections. That is the case for ISIS’s resolution to symbolically seize the small village of Dabiq in 2014; the city is of no strategic significance however is described in a prophecy by the Prophet Mohammad and was, due to this fact, taken on ideological and non-rational grounds (Gambhir, 2014; Wignell et al., 2017: 7). Third and eventually, on a person stage, if solely rational (materials) impetuses can drive terrorism, why achieve this few individuals change into terrorists? And why not commit non-ideological crimes as an alternative? This hints at different explanatory elements at play, ideological issues as I argue, but others argue that these can solely be psychological diseases as I’ll talk about within the subsequent paragraph. Altogether, these three shortcomings enable me to refute the rationalist objection. Earlier than we conclude that terrorists want an ideology, we should first think about a selected psychological strategy that pulls onto psychological sickness as a counterargument.
Lastly, one can argue that terrorists do not want an ideology as a result of psychological elements similar to narcissistic rage, paranoia, thrill-seeking, or revenge can drive people to radicalisation (Horgan, 2019). There may be proof that psychological sickness is typically related to terrorists (Gill et al., 2015). By this lens, one can perceive terrorism because the collective behaviour of people with the only real motive of inflicting harm and hurt, bodily or psychologically (Lawal, 2002: 23). If inflicting hurt is the sole motive, then it needs to be doable to be a terrorist with out the necessity for an ideology. We are able to, nonetheless, push again on this line of reasoning with a two-folded critique. First, there isn’t any prevailing proof that psychological diseases or psychological circumstances generally play a key function in predetermined terrorist participation or motion (Horgan, 2019: 209). Crenshaw (1981) and Richardson (2007), due to this fact, doubt the worth of explaining terrorists as psychologically disturbed and even observe that terrorists are notable for his or her normalcy. Second, if one acts with the only real objective to inflict hurt, that’s, with none want for ideological issues, then it shouldn’t matter who they aim nor can there be an overarching (political) goal. If that is so, following the aforementioned definition and most prevailing understandingof terrorism, then it’s not terrorism however illicit violent exercise as an alternative. This particular psychological strategy, thus, fails to sufficiently push again on this essay’s important argument that terrorists want an ideology. However it does trace at a possible mixture of explanatory elements of terrorism, for example, psychological and ideological elements, as within the case of Anders Behring Breivik who suffered from narcissistic persona dysfunction amongst different circumstances and firmly adopted his ideology (see Faccini and Allely, 2016). But, with out an ideological underpinning, it’s not terrorism however illicit violence, and due to this fact by definition, terrorists want an ideology.
To conclude, this essay argued that terrorists want ideology as a result of it’s crucial for the intention, execution, and growth of terrorist exercise. Firstly, utilizing the assaults of Rodger, Breivik, and Lahouaiej-Bouhlel as examples, I argued that particular person terrorists want ideology to outline an overarching goal and targets and to have an inside justification for assaults and, for the terrorist organisation at massive, to draw sources and recruits. Secondly, I offered the principle objection to this argument. This objection argues that terrorists do not needan ideology as a result of collective rational or socio-organisation impetuses drive terrorism as an alternative. I exemplified this objection with the 9/11 assault and the person case of Choudhury. Thirdly, I refuted this objection for 3 causes: (1) terrorism is a statistically unsuccessful means to an finish; (2) it’s troublesome to discern a rationalist technique from its ideological tenets; (3) on a person stage, if terrorism is a rational pursuit for materials beneficial properties, then extra individuals might need been terrorists. Lastly, I raised a second objection which argues that terrorists don’t want an ideology as a result of psychological circumstances, similar to narcissistic persona dysfunction or psychosis, can, in some instances, be the only real driver to radicalisation as an alternative. In response, I argued that this fails as a result of if there isn’t any overarching goal or objective, then it’s not terrorism however illicit violence as an alternative. Altogether, this leads me to conclude that terrorists want an ideology.
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